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Note 
 
Removing the Judicial Gag Rule: A Proposal for 
Changing Judicial Speech Regulations to 
Encourage Public Discussion of Active Cases 
Michael D. Schoepf∗ 
Diminished public confidence in the judiciary has become 
one of the most important issues facing American courts.1 
United States District Judge Nancy Gertner said at a Septem-
ber 2007 congressional hearing that judges need to show the 
public they can act competently and without prejudice.2 She ob-
served, “[j]udges in one sense have to prove their legitimacy . . . 
it’s no longer assumed by the public. And I would rather prove 
that legitimacy in my own voice with my own face and my own 
words than have my words described by a late night TV anc-
hor.”3 In many states, though, codes of judicial conduct make 
that impossible outside of the bounds of the courtroom; not only 
do the rules prevent judges from “speaking in their own words,” 
they prevent judges from speaking about active cases at all.4 
The rules in Illinois and Massachusetts, for example, prohibit 
 
∗  J.D. Candidate 2009, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2004, 
University of Minnesota. The author thanks Professor Jane Kirtley for her 
help with topic selection and comments on an earlier draft. He would also like 
to thank the editors and staff of the Minnesota Law Review for their invalua-
ble feedback and expert editing. Finally, the author thanks Valerie for her 
constant support. Copyright © 2008 by Michael D. Schoepf. 
 1. Charles Gardner Geyh, Roscoe Pound and the Future of the Good Gov-
ernment Movement, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 871, 875–76 (2007) (“[C]oncern for flag-
ging public confidence in the courts dominates contemporary discourse on the 
administration of justice.”). 
 2. Sunshine in the Courtroom Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 2128 Before 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter Hearing] 
(statement of Judge Nancy Gertner, U.S. District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts). The bill would increase the number of cameras allowed in 
federal courtrooms by allowing federal judges to permit electronic media into 
courtroom proceedings. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See, e.g., ILL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(6) (barring 
judges from speaking about “pending or impending” cases outside the cour-
troom); MASS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(9) (same). 
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all speech about pending or impending cases outside of a 
judge’s official courtroom duties.5 
The speech restrictions, coupled with criticism in the popu-
lar press, have led to a rise in defamation suits filed by judges 
against newspapers and corresponding outrage in the media.6 
Judges alone filed ten percent of defamation suits nationwide 
in 2005.7 Judges say they need a forum to respond to criticism. 
After all, the judicial system should be open to all Americans.8 
But members of the press argue that the system is stacked 
against media organizations when judges file lawsuits as liti-
gants in the same jurisdictions where they sit as judges.9 Re-
moving the code of silence and allowing judges, as Gertner said, 
to speak in their “own voice[s]”10 would help restore public trust 
in the judiciary. 
This Note argues that increased communication between 
judges and the public will restore confidence in an institution 
the founders believed would bridge the gap between Congress 
and the people.11 Part I explains that the press will not, and 
should not, stop criticizing the judiciary. But unless judges are 
given the opportunity to respond, the alarming number of judi-
cial defamation suits will continue to rise. Part II explains cur-
rent restrictions on judicial speech in the American Bar Associ-
 
 5. ILL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(6); MASS. CODE OF JUDI-
CIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(9). 
 6. Adam Liptak, A Judge at the Plaintiff ’s Table Tips the Scales, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 25, 2007, at A12 (“Libel lawsuits by judges, which have spiked in 
recent years, put an unusual strain on the justice system.”); Tony Mauro, 
Press Frets as More Judges Claim Libel, LEGAL TIMES, June 18, 2007, at 8 
(noting the increase in judicial libel suits and corresponding calls for changes 
in the press). 
 7. Mauro, supra note 6. 
 8. See id. (quoting a lawyer for a judge as noting that judges have the 
same Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial as other citizens); Defendants’ 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Shaw Suburban Media Group 
v. Thomas, No. 07 CV 03289 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 8, 2007), 2007 WL 2435795 (ar-
guing it does not violate constitutional due process for the Chief Justice of the 
Illinois Supreme Court to bring suit in state court and call several other su-
preme court justices as witnesses in the trial). 
 9. See Mauro, supra note 6. 
 10. Hearing, supra note 2 (statement of Judge Nancy Gertner, U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Massachusetts) (arguing that permitting cameras 
in the courtrooms would cause judges to prove their legitimacy through their 
in-court actions). 
 11. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 506 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modern 
Library 1937) (“[T]he courts were designed to be an intermediate body be-
tween the people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the 
latter within the limits assigned to their authority.”). 
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ation’s Model Code and selected states. It also discusses the 
constitutionality of those restrictions under the First Amend-
ment. Part III argues that most states cling to overbroad re-
strictions on what judges can say about pending cases in viola-
tion of the First Amendment. Part IV proposes a new system to 
regulate judicial speech intended to create a public discussion 
about the judiciary in which the judges themselves are impor-
tant participants. 
I. JUDGES V. THE MEDIA: THE RISE IN JUDICIAL 
DEFAMATION SUITS  
A. JUDGE MURPHY AND THE BOSTON HERALD 
On February 13, 2002, the Boston Herald published the 
first in a series of articles criticizing Massachusetts Superior 
Court Judge Ernest B. Murphy for doling out lenient “pro-
defendant” sentences and “heartlessly demean[ing]” victims.12 
The article reported that prosecutors confronted Murphy after 
he sentenced a rapist to probation, and Murphy said of the vic-
tim: “She can’t go through life as a victim. She’s 14. She got 
raped. Tell her to get over it.”13 Reporters Dave Wedge and 
Jules Crittenden cited “several courthouse sources” as having 
heard Murphy’s comment, but did not name the sources of the 
information.14 The next day, February 14, the Herald ran 
another story about Murphy.15 The story called Murphy a 
“criminal-coddling judge” who sentenced a rapist to eight years 
of probation despite a state guideline calling for five-and-a-half 
to seven years in prison and the tearful testimony of the four-
teen-year-old victim.16 Wedge caught Murphy on his way to 
lunch, but the judge “turned down the chance to explain his 
judicial philosophy.”17 The story recorded Murphy’s comment: 
 
 12. Dave Wedge &  Jules Crittenden, Murphy’s Law: Lenient Judge Frees 
Dangerous Criminals, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 13, 2002, at 1. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. Wedge continued to report on Murphy, see, e.g., Dave Wedge, 
Judge Sentenced to ‘Rookie School’, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 16, 2002, at 1, but 
Crittenden moved on to other stories, see, e.g., Jules Crittenden, Local Nukes 
Prepped for Tighter Regs on Security, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 15, 2002, at 7. 
Crittenden was not a party to the defamation suit. See Murphy v. Boston He-
rald, Inc., 865 N.E.2d 746 (Mass. 2007).  
 15. Dave Wedge, Rape Victim’s Mom Pleads . . . Dump the Judge, BOSTON 
HERALD, Feb. 14, 2002, at 1. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
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“‘I really can’t talk about the situation,’ he said. ‘I have no 
comment.’”18 Wedge had also tried to talk with Murphy before 
the first story ran, but a court clerk had turned him away.19 
According to his deposition testimony, Wedge even offered to 
leave a note with Murphy’s clerk, but to no avail.20 
The Herald continued to run articles critical of Murphy.21 
On March 6, 2002, Murphy finally responded; he granted an in-
terview with the Herald’s competitor, the Boston Globe.22 Mur-
phy told the Globe that he had a lobby conference relating to 
the sexual assault trial but insisted that he had nothing but 
sympathy for the victim and had never said that she should 
“get over it.”23 Murphy suggested that the series of stories in 
the Herald were the result of the District Attorney’s campaign 
to discredit him.24 Despite reading Murphy’s denial, Wedge ap-
peared on The O’Reilly Factor, a national television program, 
the next day and affirmed that he was absolutely certain that 
Murphy had said the fourteen-year-old victim should “get over 
it.”25 
 
 18. Id. 
 19. Murphy, 865 N.E.2d at 755–56 (noting Wedge’s testimony at trial and 
in deposition were somewhat contradictory as to his effort to get Murphy’s 
comments before the story ran, but confirming that Murphy refused to com-
ment the day the first story ran based on the prohibition of speech about ac-
tive cases). 
 20. Id. 
 21. See, e.g., Editorial, Berating Victims Way Over the Line, BOSTON HE-
RALD, Feb. 14, 2002, at 26 (“New Bedford Superior Court Judge Ernest B. 
Murphy is acquiring a reputation as the kind of guy who makes the phrase 
criminal justice system an oxymoron.”); Doug Hanchett, Victim’s Mother Files 
Complaint Against Murphy, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 17, 2002, at 9 (repeating 
the “get over it” comment); Wedge, supra note 14 (repeating the “get over it” 
comment and suggesting Murphy needs intensive training); Dave Wedge, 
Lawmakers Taking Aim at Wrist-Slapping Judge, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 15, 
2002, at 2 (calling Murphy’s comments to victims “heartless” and repeating 
the allegation that he said a rape victim should “get over it”). 
 22. Brian C. Mooney, Judge Accuses DA of Character Assassination: Mur-
phy Breaks Silence and Hints at Intimidation, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 6, 2002, 
at B1. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. The district attorney, Paul F. Walsh Jr., denied any involvement in 
a campaign to discredit Murphy. Id. However, at a later defamation trial it 
was revealed that Walsh was Wedge’s source of information on the “get over 
it” quote. Murphy, 865 N.E.2d at 757. 
 25. The O’Reilly Factor (Fox News Network television broadcast Mar. 7, 
2002). The host asked Wedge: “Are you absolutely 100 percent sure that Judge 
Murphy said that the rape victim should get over it?” Wedge responded: “Yes, 
he said this—he made this comment to three lawyers. He knows he said it, 
and everybody else that knows this judge knows that he said it.” Id. 
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Gagged by the Massachusetts Code of Judicial Conduct,26 
Murphy did nothing for three months. According to his lawyers, 
formerly a “proud, gregarious man, he became diminished, 
scared, and sad.”27 In June 2002 he filed a complaint in the 
Massachusetts Superior Court, the same court in which he was 
a judge, alleging that the newspaper articles and public com-
ments from Wedge and the Boston Herald were false and defa-
matory.28 After a twenty-day trial, a jury awarded Murphy 
$2.09 million in compensatory damages.29 According to the 
court, Murphy never said: “She’s [fourteen]. She got raped. Tell 
her to get over it.” He said something more like: “She’s got to 
get on with her life. She needs to get over it.”30 Murphy ex-
pressed concern for the victim; he did not demean her or show a 
lack of sympathy.31 The whole incident arose from a miscom-
munication between Murphy and a young prosecutor and the 
carelessness of a reporter.32 The veil of secrecy cast over the ju-
diciary by the Code of Judicial Conduct only served to aggra-
vate the situation.33 
On appeal, a unanimous Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court affirmed in May 2007,34 but the incident did not end well 
for either party. Murphy is seeking early retirement—with a 
full pension—claiming the incident damaged his reputation 
and emotional stability to such an extent that he cannot con-
tinue as a judge and deserves disability payments.35 He also 
faces a public reprimand for violations of the code of judicial 
conduct related to a post-trial incident in which he sent the He-
 
 26. MASS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(9) (“Except as other-
wise provided in this section, a judge shall abstain from public comment about 
a pending or impending Massachusetts proceeding in any court, and shall re-
quire similar abstention on the part of court personnel.”). 
 27. Murphy, 865 N.E.2d at 750. 
 28. Id. at 751. 
 29. Id. The judge later ruled that some of the defendants’ allegedly defa-
matory statements “qualified as protected statements” as a matter of law and 
reduced the verdict to $2.01 million. Id. 
 30. Id. at 756–57. 
 31. Id. at 757–58. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See MASS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(9). 
 34. Murphy, 865 N.E.2d at 749. 
 35. Scott Van Voorhis, Judge’s Disability Plea Rejected: Says Herald Suit 
Led to Stress Disorder, BOSTON HERALD, Aug. 3, 2007, at 6. While Murphy 
may pursue other pension options, Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick re-
jected Murphy’s disability pension request two days after he filed it. Id. 
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rald’s publisher a threatening note on judicial stationary.36 For 
its part, the Herald claims to be the victim of a biased judiciary 
and a vengeful judge,37 and the publisher remains steadfast in 
his support of the stories and reporter Wedge.38 
Public fights, like the one between Murphy and the Herald, 
are unusual, but judges’ defamation suits increasingly are not. 
Since 2000, more judges have turned to the courts in response 
to criticism in the popular press.39 Victories mean vindication 
for the individual judges, but the effects on the judicial institu-
tion are not so positive.40 
B. THE SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE PRESS AND THE 
JUDICIARY 
Cases like the one in Massachusetts leave both sides un-
happy and fail to enhance public support for the judiciary or 
ensure its “independence, integrity, and impartiality.”41 Al-
though still uncommon, judges are moving from behind the 
bench to a seat at the plaintiff ’s table with increasing regulari-
ty. Judges filed ten percent of libel cases nationwide in 2005.42 
A case filed by Chief Justice Robert Thomas of the Illinois Su-
preme Court grew so contentious that the newspaper’s lawyers 
filed an additional Section 1983 civil rights suit against ten 
current and former Illinois Supreme Court justices.43 The 
newspaper claimed the justices violated its civil rights when 
they testified as character witnesses in the trial but refused on 
 
 36. Raja Mishra, Judge Who Won Libel Suit Faces Ethics Charges: Com-
mission Says He Tried to Bully Herald, BOSTON GLOBE, July 11, 2007, at B3. 
 37. Petition for Rehearing of Defendants/Appellants Boston Herald, Inc. 
and David Wedge at 1, 4–5, 9, Murphy v. Boston Herald, Inc., 865 N.E.2d 746 
(Mass. 2007) (No. SJC-09782) (arguing the court got the facts wrong, and the 
author of the opinion, Justice John M. Greaney, was biased); see also John M. 
Greaney & Rudolph Kass, Op-Ed., Judging Judges: It’s Not That Easy, BOS-
TON HERALD, July 16, 1997, at 21 (arguing the press should “examin[e] judi-
cial performance with a lens rather than a hand grenade”). 
 38. See Raja Mishra & Andrew C. Ryan, SJC Upholds Judge’s Libel Victo-
ry over the Herald: Judgment of $2m Stands for ’02 Articles, BOSTON GLOBE, 
May 8, 2007, at B1 (noting Herald president and publisher Patrick J. Purcell’s 
continuing support for Wedge). 
 39. See Mauro, supra note 6. 
 40. See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 6 (noting problems with litigating a libel 
suit in a court run by the plaintiff ). 
 41. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.10 cmt. 1 (2007) (explaining 
why the rules restricting judicial speech are necessary). 
 42. Mauro, supra note 6. 
 43. See Amended Complaint, Shaw Suburban Media Group v. Thomas, 
No. 07 CV 03289 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 2007), 2007 WL 2227640. 
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cross-examination to discuss deliberations.44 The lawsuit also 
claimed that the $4 million verdict—reduced from $7 million by 
a trial court judge—violated the newspaper’s due process rights 
because it denied an appeal to the state’s highest court due to 
the lack of a quorum.45 
The lawsuit arose out of an opinion column alleging that 
Justice Robert Thomas’ political connections affected the out-
come of a high profile case.46 Thomas chose to respond to the 
allegations in the column with a lawsuit rather than a letter to 
the editor or a public statement defending his reputation.47 The 
suit settled in October 2007,48 but the ultimate costs, in terms 
of credibility and public trust in the judiciary, are difficult to 
compute. A more cautious response from Thomas could have 
produced a better outcome for the court, the public, and the 
newspaper.49 But as in Illinois, any response related to a “pend-
ing, or impending case,” would have been prohibited by the 
state’s Code of Judicial Conduct.50 The Illinois code discourages 
almost all speech about active cases.51 
Incidents like those in Massachusetts and Illinois continue 
to erode public confidence in the judiciary at an alarming 
rate.52 Dwindling public trust due to the perception of dimi-
 
 44. Id. ¶ 5. 
 45. Id. ¶¶ 6–9 (noting the justices who testified recused themselves, deny-
ing the newspaper the possibility of an appeal to the high court). 
 46. Plaintiff ’s Complaint at Law ¶¶ 21–40, Thomas v. Page, No. 04 LK 
013 (Kane County, Ill., Cir. Ct. June 9, 2004), 2004 WL 5050801. 
 47. See Thomas v. Page, 837 N.E.2d 483, 486 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
 48. Agreed Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice, Shaw Suburban Me-
dia Group v. Thomas, No. 07 CV 3289 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2007), 2007 WL 
3340326. The parties agreed to a $3 million settlement, and the newspaper 
apologized to Thomas, but the reporter insists that he reported accurate in-
formation from confidential sources. Russell Working, Defamation Suit Set-
tled: Kane County Paper to Publish Apology to Illinois Chief Justice, CHI. 
TRIB., Oct. 12, 2007, Metro, at 1. 
 49. See Mauro, supra note 6 (noting the appearance of bias when judges 
become plaintiffs); Working, supra note 48 (quoting an attorney for the Illinois 
newspaper saying the civil rights suit “may persuade the next judge” with a 
complaint “that the better approach may be to bring that complaint to the pub-
lic or bring that complaint to the publisher”). 
 50. ILL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(6) (“A judge should ab-
stain from public comment about a pending, or impending proceeding in any 
court, and should require similar abstention on the part of court personnel 
subject to the judge’s direction and control.”). 
 51. Id. 
 52. See Hearing, supra note 2 (statement of Judge Nancy Gertner, U.S. 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts) (stating that modern judges 
need to prove their “legitimacy”); Liptak, supra note 6 (noting that a spike in 
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nished integrity has become the most critical issue facing the 
judiciary today.53 More judicial speech, not less, could change 
that tide. Opening channels of communication between the ju-
diciary, the press, and consequently the public, will help slow 
the erosion of public confidence.54 
The popular press will continue reporting on judicial ac-
tions, and it should.55 But as more information comes directly 
from judges rather than secondhand sources, the reporting will 
be increasingly accurate.56 Stories incorporating comments 
from judges will not always praise the courts, but opening a di-
alogue between the press and the judiciary will allow judges to 
show their skills to the public.57 The media will expose a few 
incompetent judges along the way, but that seems to weigh in 
favor of increasing speech rather than against it. Judicial 
speech restrictions were never intended to hide incompetence.58 
As Justice Brandeis wrote, “If there be time to expose through 
discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the 
processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, 
not enforced silence.”59 
 
lawsuits filed by judges has put a “strain” on the judicial system); Mauro, su-
pra note 6 (noting that judges filing lawsuits in courts where they also preside 
creates the appearance of impropriety). 
 53. See ABA COMM’N ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY, JUSTICE IN JEO-
PARDY 51 (2003) [hereinafter ABA COMM’N] (“The continuing ability of the 
courts to function then depends upon public acceptance of their institutional 
legitimacy; without it, the courts can and will be ignored or obliterated.”); 
Geyh, supra note 1, at 875–76 (arguing that flagging public confidence domi-
nates discourse about the judiciary). 
 54. But see Greaney & Kass, supra note 37 (arguing in an editorial that 
the media should be more thoughtful in their critiques of the bench). 
 55. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (“[The] pro-
found national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues 
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include 
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government 
and public officials.”). 
 56. See Evelle J. Younger, Fair Trial, Free Press and the Man in the Mid-
dle, 56 A.B.A. J. 127, 128–30 (1970) (“The muzzling of responsible sources of 
information creates a vacuum that will be filled by irresponsible sources.”). 
 57. See Hearing, supra note 2 (statement of Judge Nancy Gertner, U.S. 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts) (arguing that allowing media 
into the courtroom will allow the public to see judges in action). 
 58. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.10 cmt. 1 (2007) (explaining 
the purpose of the speech restrictions is to promote fairness and impartiality). 
 59. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).  
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II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND JUDICIAL SPEECH  
In 2007, the American Bar Association (ABA) adopted new 
model rules governing judicial speech.60 This Section examines 
those rules under the First Amendment. The ABA’s rule-
makers have pushed the limits of speech restrictions seeking to 
outlaw as much judicial speech as the Constitution will allow.61 
This Note proposes that the proper question, from both a con-
stitutional and public policy perspective, is not how much regu-
lation the Constitution will allow, but how much regulation an 
impartial judiciary actually requires. The proper remedy for 
what ails the American judiciary is more speech, not less. 
A. THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT: RESTRICTIONS ON 
JUDICIAL SPEECH 
The ABA recommends a set of rules to govern judicial con-
duct.62 Inherent in the rules is the understanding that judges 
“must respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust and 
strive to maintain and enhance confidence in the legal sys-
tem.”63 While vesting substantial discretion in individual 
judges,64 the rules remain remarkably all-encompassing, regu-
lating aspects of judicial conduct both on and off the bench.65 
For example, the speech restrictions regulate what a judge can 
say about pending cases, government hearings, and elections.66 
Rule 2.10 restricts judicial speech concerning active cases, 
stating as a general rule that judges should make no public or 
private statements that might “affect the outcome or impair the 
fairness” of a case.67 Before 2007, the rule prohibited all speech 
 
 60. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT. 
 61. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT. 
 62. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT. 
 63. Id. pmbl. 
 64. See id. (noting the canons provide guidelines for interpreting the 
rules, and that “may” and “should” provisions indicate that the judge must de-
termine for herself whether to abide by the recommendations). 
 65. See, e.g., id. R. 2.1 (“The duties of judicial office, as prescribed by law, 
shall take precedence over all of a judge’s personal and extrajudicial activi-
ties.”) (cross-references omitted); id. R. 3.13 (placing restrictions on judges, 
and their families, accepting gifts and requiring judges to report certain gifts 
in accordance with Rule 3.15). 
 66. Id. R. 2.9—2.10. 
 67. Id. R. 2.10. Paragraph (A) states in full: “A judge shall not make any 
public statement that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome or 
impair the fairness of a matter pending or impending in any court, or make 
any nonpublic statement that might substantially interfere with a fair trial or 
hearing.” Id. (cross-references omitted). Paragraph (B) states: “A judge shall 
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about an active case regardless of whether it was likely to im-
pair fairness.68 Some states, including Illinois and Massachu-
setts, continue to follow this model.69 The modern Model Code 
extends the restriction to “court staff, court officials, and others 
subject to the judge’s direction and control.”70 
The Model Code has always contained several exceptions to 
Rule 2.10’s general speech restrictions.71 For example, “a judge 
may make public statements in the course of official duties 
[and] may explain court procedures.”72 But history has shown 
that many judges fail to read beyond “[a] judge shall not” 
speak.73 Uncertain about what they can or cannot say, judges 
choose to say nothing at all. 
The ABA adopted the current rule in 2007 after four years 
of study and debate.74 Among the changes, the ABA approved 
additional exceptions to the judicial speech restrictions.75 For 
example, new Model Rule 2.10 allows a judge to respond to al-
legations in the media concerning judicial conduct.76 However, 
that allowance is subject to the rule’s fairness requirements.77 
Thus, the change adds almost nothing new; a judge may re-
spond to allegations of misconduct only if the response does not 
 
not, in connection with cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come 
before the court, make pledges, promises, or commitments that are inconsis-
tent with the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of judicial of-
fice.” Id. (cross-references omitted). 
 68. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(6) (1990), reprinted in 
THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 1990 SELECTED STANDARDS ON 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 346 (1990). 
 69. See ILL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(6); MASS. CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(9). 
 70. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.10 (2007). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id.; see Gary A. Hengstler, Pressing Engagements: Courting Better Re-
lationships Between Judges and Journalists, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 419, 424 
(2006) (commenting on the previous version of the rule and arguing most 
judges interpret it to mean they cannot talk to reporters about active cases at 
all). 
 74. See ABA JOINT COMM’N TO EVALUATE THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT, OVERVIEW OF MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT AS ADOPTED 
FEBRUARY 12, 2007, available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/ 
Overview_GAK_030707.pdf. 
 75. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.10. 
 76. Id. Paragraph (E) states: “Subject to the requirements of paragraph 
(A), a judge may respond directly or through a third party to allegations in the 
media or elsewhere concerning the judge’s conduct in a matter.” Id. 
 77. Id. 
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impair fairness.78 Although still restrictive, the model rule pro-
vides substantially more room for judicial speech than many 
states’ rules. 
Both Illinois and Massachusetts, where Thomas and Mur-
phy recently prevailed on their defamation claims, restrict judi-
cial speech concerning pending cases almost without excep-
tion.79 The Illinois code uses “should” rather than “shall” 
language, which changes the rule from an absolute prohibition 
to a general guideline, but still discourages judicial speech.80 
Furthermore, both codes allow judges to speak publicly when 
they are actually in the courtroom, and to explain legal proce-
dures.81 Minnesota and Oklahoma, on the other hand, two 
states that have recently reviewed their codes,82 employ more 
permissive language analogous to the ABA’s Model Rule 2.10—
that a judge should not engage in extrajudicial speech that will 
impair the fairness of a trial—but neither state’s code contains 
an exception for judges responding to media criticism.83 Like 
Illinois, Oklahoma employs “should” rather than “shall” lan-
guage, potentially leaving judges with discretion to speak in 
other circumstances.84 
 
 78. See id. 
 79. ILL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(6) (“A judge should ab-
stain from public comment about a pending or impending proceeding . . . . This 
paragraph does not prohibit judges from making public statements in the 
course of their official duties or from explaining for public information the pro-
cedures of the court.”); MASS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(9) (pro-
hibiting judges from speaking about “pending or impending” cases except 
where the judge is speaking as part of the judge’s official duties, participating 
in a legal education program, or the judge is a litigant). 
 80. ILL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(6); see also Hengstler, 
supra note 73, at 424 (arguing judges tend to focus on the restrictive portion of 
the rule).  
 81. ILL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(6); MASS. CODE OF JUDI-
CIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(9). Massachusetts’s code also allows judges to 
speak at educational events or if they are themselves litigants. MASS. CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(9). 
 82. AM. BAR ASS’N, STATUS OF STATE REVIEW OF ABA MODEL CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2007), http://www.abanet.org/cpr/jclr/jud_status_chart.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2008). 
 83. MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(8) (“A judge shall not 
. . . make any public comment [about a proceeding] that might reasonably be 
expected to affect its outcome or impair its fairness . . . .”); OKLA. CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(8) (“A judge should not, while a proceeding is 
pending or impending in any court, make any public comment that might rea-
sonably be expected to affect the outcome or impair its fairness . . . .”). 
 84. See OKLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(8). 
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Every state has the authority to adopt its own rules to go-
vern the conduct of judges and lawyers. Historical evidence 
suggests that even if states decide to adopt the new Model Code 
of Judicial Conduct, it will take years before it achieves wide-
spread acceptance.85 Furthermore, states adopt the rules they 
like and reject others, making the ABA’s recommendation that 
states change restrictions on judicial speech years away from 
implementation.86 The slow pace of adoption, coupled with the 
states’ ability to change the rules as they choose, makes mea-
ningful exceptions to Rule 2.10 possible. 
B. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CONTENT-BASED PRIOR 
RESTRAINTS 
The Supreme Court distinguishes between content-based 
and content-neutral restrictions on speech.87 Content-neutral 
restrictions—those that regulate the time, place, or manner of 
speech—are valid so long as they are reasonable.88 Content-
based restrictions, like the restrictions imposed by the judicial 
codes, are presumptively invalid.89 To withstand First Amend-
ment strict scrutiny, the government must prove that the con-
tent-based restrictions further a compelling state interest and 
that there are no less restrictive means available to further 
that interest.90 
In deciding whether a specific law is content-based or con-
tent-neutral, courts look to the government’s motives in adopt-
ing the law. If the government adopted the regulation as a way 
to limit a certain class of speech based on the idea, message, or 
viewpoint it contains, courts should generally apply strict scru-
tiny.91 Laws that restrict the time, place, or manner of speaking 
 
 85. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 82 (stating that thirty-three states 
have formed committees to review the new rules for judicial conduct); ABA, 
STATUS OF STATE REVIEW OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULES, http://www 
.abanet.org/cpr/jclr/ethics_2000_status_chart.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2008) 
(noting that thirty-five states have adopted the model rules for attorney con-
duct recommended by the ABA in 2003). 
 86. See Am. Bar Ass’n, Charts Comparing Professional Conduct Rules as 
Adopted by States to ABA Model Rules, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/jclr/ 
charts.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2008) (providing links by individual state to 
charts comparing the state’s rules to those proposed by the ABA).  
 87. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994); Consol. 
Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980). 
 88. Consol. Edison, 447 U.S. at 536. 
 89. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). 
 90. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774–75 (2002). 
 91. Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 642–43.  
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are less suspect and merit lesser scrutiny because they are un-
likely to “excis[e] certain ideas or viewpoints from the public 
dialogue.”92 Thus a law that restricts posting signs on all public 
property withstands First Amendment scrutiny because it is 
silent on what the signs may or may not say.93 A law limiting 
sales and solicitations at a state fair to certain areas on the fair 
grounds faces lesser scrutiny because it applies evenhandedly 
to all sales people and solicitors.94 But a law that restricts polit-
ical speech near a poling place must face strict scrutiny because 
the statute depends on whether the speech is political, not just 
where it occurs.95 
C. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA V. WHITE: THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CONTENT-BASED RESTRICTIONS ON 
JUDICIAL SPEECH 
In 1996 Gregory Wersal sought election to the Minnesota 
Supreme Court, but withdrew after a complaint was filed with 
the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility alleging that 
he violated the Code of Judicial Conduct by distributing litera-
ture that criticized Minnesota Supreme Court decisions.96 Two 
years later, again running for judicial office, he filed a com-
plaint seeking declaratory relief in U.S. District Court. Wersal 
argued that a provision of the code that prevented judicial can-
didates from stating their views on legal issues violated his 
First Amendment right to free speech.97 The case eventually 
reached the U.S. Supreme Court where five justices agreed 
with Wersal and struck down the provision as unconstitution-
al.98 
In a decision authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the ma-
jority noted that content-based restrictions on speech by candi-
dates for public office must stand up to strict scrutiny.99 Strict 
scrutiny requires that the challenged provision be “(1) narrowly 
 
 92. Id. at 642. 
 93. Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 
816–17 (1984). 
 94. Heffron v. Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 649 
(1981). 
 95. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197 (1992). 
 96. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 768–69 (2002). 
 97. Id. at 769–70; see MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000) (making it a violation for a candidate for judicial office to 
“announce his or her views on disputed legal or political issues”). 
 98. Republican Party of Minn., 536 U.S. at 788. 
 99. Id. at 774. 
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tailored, to serve a (2) compelling state interest.”100 The majori-
ty did not decide whether the state had a compelling interest in 
an impartial judiciary; instead, the majority rested its decision 
on the absence of narrow tailoring.101 According to Justice Sca-
lia, a restriction that stifles judicial speech without effectively 
advancing the purported interest in an impartial judiciary is 
“woefully underinclusive” because it allows judges to state posi-
tions on issues prior to declaring their candidacy and after elec-
tion, but prohibits such speech while running for office.102 The 
decision also emphasized the importance of political speech and 
the Court’s longstanding insistence that protecting the ability 
to disseminate information to the electorate about candidates is 
one of the core purposes of the First Amendment.103 The Court, 
however, did not say that content-based restrictions on judicial 
speech outside the context of elections lie beyond the scope of 
the First Amendment. All content-based restrictions on speech 
are presumptively invalid,104 and can only be upheld if they are 
the least restrictive means of achieving the desired outcome.105 
D. RESTRICTIONS ON ATTORNEY SPEECH CONCERNING PENDING 
OR IMPENDING CASES 
The U.S. Supreme Court has never explicitly evaluated re-
strictions on judicial speech concerning active cases, but in the 
1991 case Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, the Court considered 
attorney speech about active cases.106 Dominic Gentile, a Neva-
da attorney, represented Grady Sanders in a 1988 proceeding 
in which Sanders was accused of stealing nearly $300,000 in 
traveler’s’ checks and nine pounds of cocaine from the Las Ve-
gas Police Department.107 The same day Sanders was indicted, 
Gentile held a press conference at which he refuted the accusa-
tions in the indictment, questioned the credibility of the prose-
cution’s witnesses, and suggested the real culprit was Las Ve-
gas Police Detective Steve Scholl.108 Sanders later said that he 
 
 100. Id. at 775. 
 101. Id. at 775–88. 
 102. Id. at 779–80. 
 103. Id. at 781–82. 
 104. Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 127 S. Ct. 2372, 2381 (2007); Ash-
croft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp. 
463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983); Police Dept. of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 
 105. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 665 (2004). 
 106. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991). 
 107. Id. at 1039–41. 
 108. Id. at app. A, 1059–60. 
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held the conference to prevent the “poison[ing]” of the jury pool 
due to inaccurate pretrial publicity.109 
A Nevada jury eventually acquitted Sanders,110 but the 
State Bar Association filed a complaint against Gentile alleging 
the press conference violated Nevada Supreme Court Rule 
177.111 The Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board issued a pri-
vate reprimand to Gentile finding that his comments at the 
press conference violated the Nevada rule prohibiting any 
“extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect 
to be disseminated by means of public communication if the 
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will have a 
substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative 
proceeding.”112 
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the rule 
did not violate Gentile’s First Amendment rights, but a divided 
U.S. Supreme Court reversed.113 Separate opinions authored by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, held that Neva-
da Supreme Court Rule 177 was void for vagueness because the 
Nevada Supreme Court failed to give lawyers proper notice of 
the types of speech that were allowed, but the underlying lan-
guage could stand up to constitutional scrutiny if properly in-
terpreted.114 The disputed rule prevented attorneys from is-
suing public statements that “the lawyer knows or reasonably 
should know . . . will have a substantial likelihood of materially 
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding.”115 Because attorneys 
have a special duty to the clients and the courts, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist held, the Constitution permits greater restrictions 
on attorney speech concerning active cases than speech by the 
press and the public.116 Although judges and attorneys play dif-
ferent roles in trials, it seems the same rationale could apply to 
place greater limits on judicial speech. 
 
 109. Id. at 1042–43. 
 110. Id. at 1047. 
 111. Id. at 1033. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 1033, 1058. 
 114. Id. at 1048, 1074–75. 
 115. Id. at app. B, 1060. 
 116. Id. at 1074–75. 
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III. STATE REGULATIONS OF JUDICIAL SPEECH AND 
THE CONSTITUTION  
An effort to discern whether state regulations of judicial 
speech concerning active cases violates the Constitution must 
begin with a closer look at the specific language of those re-
strictions. Massachusetts’s restrictive language may infringe on 
First Amendment rights, while Oklahoma’s more permissive 
language may not.117 This Section begins with a discussion of 
the most restrictive codes, specifically the Massachusetts’s 
code. Next, it considers whether changes implemented by the 
ABA, and in states like Oklahoma, make the prohibitions suffi-
ciently narrow to withstand First Amendment scrutiny. 
A. THE MASSACHUSETTS CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
1. An Outline of the Statutory Language 
Massachusetts’s code prohibits all “public comment about a 
pending or impending Massachusetts proceeding in any 
court.”118 It contains three subsections outlining exceptions to 
the broad general rule. First, a judge may comment publicly 
from the bench in the course of the judge’s official duties, ex-
plain general legal principles and procedures for public infor-
mation, and state information contained within the public 
record for the case.119 Second, a judge may discuss in “legal 
education programs . . . cases and issues pending in appellate 
courts” so long as the discussions do not “interfere with a fair 
hearing of the case.”120 Third, judges may discuss cases in 
which they are a party.121 
Due to its scope and the textual limitations of the excep-
tions, the rule functions as a virtual gag order on judicial 
speech about active cases. Judge Murphy seems to have read 
the rule this way. He refused to speak to reporters, saying “I 
really can’t talk about the situation.”122 Adding to the problem, 
 
 117. Compare OKLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(8) (employ-
ing “should” language as a suggestion that judges should not speak about 
“pending or impending” cases in a way that “might reasonably” impede a fair 
trial), with MASS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(9) (prohibiting all 
speech, whether it is likely to impair a fair trial or not, and using “shall” lan-
guage). 
 118. MASS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(9). 
 119. Id. Canon 3(B)(9)(a). 
 120. Id. Canon 3(B)(9)(b). 
 121. Id. Canon 3(B)(9)(c). 
 122. Wedge, supra note 15. 
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the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has never reviewed 
Canon 3(b)(9)’s restrictions on judicial speech to offer guidance 
on what judges may say. Together, these factors chill judicial 
speech even in areas where the code would technically allow 
public comments.123 
This chilling effect was apparent with Judge Murphy. Even 
if restrictions were in effect with regard to his comments about 
the sexual assault victim because of a pending appeal, Murphy 
still could have discussed with reporters the general legal pro-
cedures regarding lobby conferences and sentencing, or referred 
reporters to a public record that would have helped reporters to 
better understand the case.124 His eventual comments to the 
Boston Globe indicate that some speech was permitted, but the 
restrictive rules required careful consideration of exactly how 
much speech was allowed.125 
2. The Massachusetts Code Prohibits Speech Based on its 
Content 
The Massachusetts Code, like laws that target political 
speech near polling places,126 regulates speech based on its con-
tent and the speaker.127 The code targets a specific type of 
speech uttered by specific speakers, and completely prohibits it. 
Under the code, judges, and only judges, can reveal almost 
nothing about their own thoughts and ideas as they relate to an 
active case.128 “[T]he First Amendment means that government 
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its 
ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”129 The statute is con-
tent-based because it focuses on the subject matter of the 
speech, an active case, and prohibits it. A content-neutral sta-
tute would entirely prohibit public comment by active judges 
about cases, the law, or anything else. While such a statute 
would seem destined for failure due to overbreadth because it 
forecloses an entire class of speech, content-neutral restrictions 
work in other situations.130 
 
 123. See id.  
 124.  See MASS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(9). 
 125.  See Mooney, supra note 22. 
 126. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197 (1992). 
 127. See MASS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(9). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Police Dept. of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 
 130. See Burson, 504 U.S. at 197 (holding that a statute that specifically 
targets speech near a polling place targets political content, ignoring “other 
categories of speech, such as commercial solicitation, distribution, and dis-
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Proponents of judicial speech restrictions may contend that 
the Massachusetts rules are valid “time, place, and manner” 
restrictions under the First Amendment.131 After all, the code 
does not restrict judicial speech indefinitely, but only as long as 
the matter is “pending or impending” before a state court.132 
Thus the restriction does not perpetually prohibit discussion 
about cases, but it postpones the discussion until the case is no 
longer active. However, this argument ignores the rule that a 
“valid time, place, and manner restriction [on First Amendment 
rights] . . . ‘may not be based upon either the content or subject 
matter of speech.’”133 Any restriction, even if temporary, still 
prohibits speech based on its content. 
3. Application of Strict Scrutiny to the Massachusetts Code of 
Judicial Conduct 
The First Amendment makes content-based regulations 
presumptively invalid.134 To withstand a constitutional chal-
lenge, the government must prove that the regulations are nar-
rowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.135 However, the 
Massachusetts code applies content-based restrictions without 
discriminating against a specific viewpoint; it restricts all judi-
cial speech related to an active case.136 The Supreme Court held 
that content-based restrictions that do not favor a particular 
viewpoint should receive less exacting scrutiny than viewpoint-
based restrictions.137 But more recent cases evaluating content-
 
play”); Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 
816 (1984) (upholding a restriction banning all signs from city property for 
aesthetic reasons and noting that a less restrictive ordinance, like one allow-
ing only political signs, may run into more severe constitutional problems for 
basing its restrictions on content); Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95 (noting that the sta-
tute at issue allowed picketing related to labor issues, but prohibited all other 
picketing, thus targeting the information on the picket signs rather than the 
act of picketing itself ). 
 131. See, e.g., Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 817 (holding that a “con-
tent-neutral, impartially administered prohibition” against posting signs did 
not violate the First Amendment).  
 132. MASS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(9). 
 133. Heffron v. Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648 
(citing Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980)). 
 134. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). 
 135. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774–75 (2002). 
 136. MASS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(9). 
 137. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 
548, 557, 564 (1973) (upholding federal restriction on political activities of fed-
eral employees after applying something less than strict scrutiny and empha-
sizing the importance of selecting federal employees based on merits and not 
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based restrictions applied strict scrutiny even in the absence of 
viewpoint discrimination.138 
In Republican Party of Minnesota, the Supreme Court de-
clined to decide whether the government had compelling inter-
ests in a fair and impartial judiciary or the appearance of a fair 
and impartial judiciary.139 Instead, the Court relied on Minne-
sota’s failure to tailor its law restricting judicial candidates 
from announcing their views on issues to narrowly serve either 
of those interests.140 Here too, that a state’s interest in fair tri-
als conducted by an independent and impartial judiciary is 
compelling is beyond debate. The question is whether the Mas-
sachusetts code is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. 
The Massachusetts code restricts substantially more 
speech than necessary. It assumes that judicial speech about 
an active case is likely to affect the outcome or otherwise im-
pair the fairness of that case. The opposite is more likely true. 
Communication furthers knowledge and understanding. Judges 
have a unique ability, due to their education, experience, and 
familiarity with the facts of a given case, to inform the public 
about what they do and how the judiciary operates. This is pre-
sumably the reason that the ABA’s Model Code allows judges to 
speak publicly about court procedures and general principles of 
law.141 During boxer Mike Tyson’s high profile 1992 rape trial, 
Judge Patricia Gifford of Indiana instructed her law clerk to 
answer the media’s procedural questions following each day of 
testimony.142 Those question and answer sessions helped re-
porters, even those more used to boxing arenas than cour-
trooms, to report fairly and accurately on the criminal trial.143 
 
politics). 
 138. See, e.g., Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 127 S. Ct. 2372, 2381 (2007) 
(upholding a content-based but viewpoint-neutral restriction because there 
was no possibility that the government was trying to limit ideas); Ashcroft v. 
ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 665–66 (2004) (requiring the government to show a nar-
rowly tailored restriction to further a compelling interest in order for a con-
tent-based but viewpoint-neutral restriction to withstand First Amendment 
scrutiny); Republican Party of Minn., 536 U.S. at 768, 774–75 (applying strict 
scrutiny to content based but viewpoint-neutral restriction on judicial speech 
while noting the particular importance of campaign speech). 
 139. See Republican Party of Minn., 536 U.S. at 775–81. 
 140. Id. at 776. 
 141. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.10(D) (2007); see also 
ABA COMM’N, supra note 53, at 51. 
 142. Hengstler, supra note 73, at 425. 
 143. See, e.g., William Nack et al., A Gruesome Account, SPORTS ILLU-
STRATED, Feb. 10, 1992, at 24 (providing a detailed account of the Tyson trial). 
Nack includes a brief discussion of “Indiana case law,” despite being a horse 
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In a high-profile tort case, like Judge Murphy’s defamation 
suit in Boston,144 the public—and the litigants—would benefit 
from a reasonable, even-tempered explanation of what exactly 
the plaintiff must prove to prevail. The judge presiding over the 
case, or one of her law clerks, is in the best position to provide 
it. Such an explanation would help to temper the agitated tone 
of the controversy created by the media and instill public confi-
dence in the judiciary. Judges make such comments to juries; 
why prohibit them from making the same comments to the pub-
lic? It is inappropriate for a judge to comment about the credi-
bility of the witnesses or a party’s likelihood of success, but the 
current Massachusetts code prohibits substantially more 
speech than necessary, making it overinclusive.145 
In addition to being overinclusive, the Massachusetts pro-
vision is underinclusive because it fails to restrict a substantial 
amount of speech that is just as important to a fair trial and 
impartial judiciary.146 Assume the following hypothetical: On 
day one a judge in Boston publicly states his opinion that all 
juvenile murder suspects should stand trial as adults. At that 
time there are no juvenile murder defendants with active cases 
in Massachusetts. On day two the local district attorney 
charges a juvenile with murder, and the judge’s day one com-
ments receive extensive coverage in the popular press. The 
Boston judge has not violated a single rule.147 But if the judge 
 
racing and boxing beat writer by trade. University of Colorado, Sixtieth An-
nual Conference on World Affairs Participants—William Nack, http://www 
.colorado.edu/cwa/bios.html?id=526&year=2005 (last visited Nov. 12, 2008). 
 144. Murphy v. Boston Herald, Inc., 865 N.E.2d 746 (Mass. 2007). 
 145. Cf. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 231–32 (2003) 
(striking down a federal statute that prohibited minors from contributing to 
political campaigns because some parents made contributions in their child-
ren’s names in order to increase their total contribution as overinclusive); Lo-
rillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 534–35, 584–85 (2001) (striking 
down a Massachusetts law restricting the advertising and promotion of tobac-
co products as overinclusive). 
 146. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 779–80 (2002) 
(calling a Minnesota statute that restricts the speech of a judicial election can-
didate “woefully underinclusive” because the restrictions do not start until the 
candidate announces her candidacy); City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 52 
(1994) (stating that underinclusiveness “diminish[es] the credibility of the 
government’s rationale for restricting speech”); Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 
524, 541–42 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (noting that underin-
clusive laws cannot be seen to “protect[ ] an interest of the highest order” (in-
ternal quotations omitted)). 
 147. The judge may be required to disqualify herself if the case came before 
her. MASS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1) (requiring judges to 
disqualify themselves in cases where “the judge’s impartiality might reasona-
 2008] JUDICIAL SPEECH 361 
 
were to make the same public comment on day two, he would 
have violated Canon 3(B)(9).148 Although there is a distinction 
between the two comments, it is unreasonable to think the day 
one comment will not affect the defendant’s right to a fair trial 
or the impartiality of the judiciary, but the day two comment 
will affect that right.149 
Moreover, the Massachusetts restriction fails because it is 
not the least restrictive means of furthering the government’s 
interest in fair and impartial trials. As the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly stated, “[i]f a less restrictive alternative would serve 
the Government’s purpose, the legislature must use that alter-
native.”150 Narrow tailoring requires that if there is a way to 
uphold fairness and impartiality without completely prohibit-
ing judicial speech about active cases, that alternative must be 
adopted. As has already been shown, the ABA’s Model Code 
does exactly that.151 It only restricts judicial speech about an 
active case when it “might reasonably be expected to affect the 
outcome or impair the fairness of a matter . . . .”152 
Under a lesser degree of scrutiny that balances the state’s 
interest in regulating speech against the speaker’s First 
Amendment interest in free communication,153 the Massachu-
setts rule remains so poorly tailored that it is unlikely to with-
stand even intermediate constitutional scrutiny. The state’s 
policy burdens “substantially more speech than necessary” to 
ensure that litigants and criminal defendants receive a fair tri-
al.154 Massachusetts’s restrictions on judicial speech violate the 
First Amendment. 
 
bly be questioned”). 
 148. MASS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(9). 
 149. Republican Party of Minn., 536 U.S. at 779–80 (noting a similar ab-
surdity in Minnesota’s Code makes “belief in that purpose a challenge to the 
credulous”). 
 150. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) 
(citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997)). 
 151. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.10 (2007). 
 152. Id. R.2.10(A). 
 153. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997) (“A con-
tent-neutral regulation will be sustained under the First Amendment if it ad-
vances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free 
speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to fur-
ther those interests.”); U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carri-
ers, 413 U.S. 548, 557, 564 (1973) (upholding federal restriction on political 
activities of federal employees after applying something less than strict scru-
tiny and emphasizing the importance of selecting federal employees based on 
merits and not politics). 
 154. Turner Broad. Sys., 520 U.S. at 189. 
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B. APPLICATION OF STRICT SCRUTINY TO THE ABA’S MODEL 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Part III.A.3 discussed the availability of the ABA’s Model 
Code as a less restrictive means of achieving Massachusetts’s 
purpose of insuring that litigants and criminal defendants re-
ceive a fair trial before an impartial judiciary. The next ques-
tion is whether the Model Code does enough to ease restrictions 
on judicial speech. 
Rule 2.10(A) of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct states 
that “[a] judge shall not make any public statement that might 
reasonably be expected to affect the outcome or impair the fair-
ness of a matter pending or impending in any court, or make 
any nonpublic statement that might substantially interfere 
with a fair trial or hearing.”155 The phrase “might reasonably 
be expected” gives the statute potentially broad application 
while at the same time creating substantial ambiguity.156 
“Might” indicates that some probability of impact on fairness 
will trigger the rule and prevent judges from speaking.157 But 
the rule offers no guidance,158 and will likely lead many judges 
to refrain from speaking about active cases at all.159 Still, de-
spite the ambiguity, the Model Code remains much more res-
pectful of First Amendment considerations than the Massachu-
setts rule. Properly construed by a judge, it could avoid some of 
the problems in the Massachusetts rule.160 
First, it limits the overinclusiveness of the rule to an ac-
ceptable level.161 Here, the statute only prohibits speech that 
 
 155. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.10(A) (emphasis added) 
(cross-references omitted). 
 156. Id. 
 157. “Might” is an auxiliary verb used “to express permission, liberty, 
probability, possibility.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 787 
(11th ed. 2003). Sometimes it is used to denote “less probability or possibility 
than may.” Id. 
 158. Some other statutes and rules that use the same phrase include ex-
amples in an effort to lend clarity to the phrase. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 226.9 
(2008) (using the phrase as part of a “Truth in Lending” regulation and listing 
examples). But see 15 U.S.C. § 3806 (2000) (using the phrase in law regarding 
methane transportation, but providing no examples). 
 159. See Hengstler, supra note 73, at 424. 
 160. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.10(A). 
 161. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 231–32 (2003) 
(striking down a federal statute that prohibited minors from contributing to 
political campaigns because some parents make contributions in their child-
ren’s names in order to increase their total contribution as overinclusive); Lo-
rillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 534–35, 584–85 (2001) (striking 
down a Massachusetts law restricting the advertising and promotion of tobac-
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“might reasonably be expected” to affect the fairness of a trial, 
while the Massachusetts rule prohibited all speech, regardless 
of whether it would affect fairness. Under the ABA rule, a 
judge presiding over Murphy’s trial could explain the complexi-
ty of defamation suits by public-figure plaintiffs to the media. 
Second, the ABA’s model rule also eliminates the underin-
clusiveness problem. Subsection (B) states that “[a] judge shall 
not, in connection with cases, controversies, or issues that are 
likely to come before the court, make pledges, promises, or 
commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial perfor-
mance of the adjudicative duties of judicial office.”162 Thus, the 
ABA’s Model Code prohibits speech, whether about an active 
case or not, that calls into question the judge’s ability to impar-
tially consider and decide cases.163 A judge in a jurisdiction go-
verned by a code that substantially follows the ABA’s Model 
Code is prohibited from stating that all juvenile murder sus-
pects should stand trial as adults whether or not there are cur-
rently any juveniles in the jurisdiction charged with murder. 
Third, subsection (E) of the ABA’s rule explicitly allows a 
judge to respond to criticism from the “media or elsewhere” so 
long as she complies with the restrictions in subsection (A).164 
This rule, while still fairly restrictive, brings the Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct more in line with the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct governing attorneys. Those rules, which govern 
attorneys rather than judges, encourage protected and valuable 
speech rather than chill it.165 
 
co products as overinclusive). 
 162. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.10(B) (cross references omit-
ted). 
 163. The ABA’s rules also eliminate the problem of defining “impartial,” 
which Justice Scalia has commented on at length. Republican Party of Minn. 
v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775–82 (2002). According to the Model Code, “impar-
tial” means “absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, particular par-
ties or classes of parties, as well as maintenance of an open mind in consider-
ing issues that may come before a judge.” MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
terminology. 
 164. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.10(E) (“Subject to the re-
quirements of paragraph (A), a judge may respond directly or through a third 
party to allegations in the media or elsewhere concerning the judge’s conduct 
in a matter.”). 
 165. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. (2002) (“[T]here are 
vital social interests served by the free dissemination of information about 
events having legal consequences and about legal proceedings themselves.”). 
The Model Rules only prohibit speech that “will have a substantial likelihood 
of materially prejudicing” an active case, and also provide a nonexhaustive list 
of statements that an attorney may make to the public. Id. R. 3.6. 
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The rules also allow an attorney to pursue a claim or de-
fense against a client even if the claim requires that the attor-
ney reveal some information that would otherwise be confiden-
tial.166 Furthermore, a broad reading of the word “controversy” 
would allow an attorney to reveal confidences when attacked 
publicly by a client or third party even if the controversy did 
not enter the judicial system.167 Although the Supreme Court 
held that limited restrictions on attorney speech concerning ac-
tive cases can withstand First Amendment scrutiny,168 the lan-
guage of the Model Rules shows that the ABA decided to allow 
more attorney speech than would be constitutionally required. 
Unlike the rules governing attorneys, the rules governing 
judges do not allow them to speak up in their defense if the 
speech “might reasonably be expected” to impair the fairness of 
an active case.169 Because of the limitations imposed by the 
judicial code, Judge Murphy in Massachusetts and Justice 
Thomas in Illinois may still feel compelled to respond to allega-
tions with lawsuits rather than public comment, interviews 
 
 166. Id. R. 1.6(b)(3) (“A lawyer may reveal information relating to the re-
presentation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary 
. . . to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy be-
tween the lawyer and the client . . . or to respond to allegations in any proceed-
ing concerning the lawyers representation of the client . . . .”); see Stone v. Sa-
triana, 41 P.3d 705, 710 (Colo. 2002) (en banc) (“When a client brings a 
malpractice allegation, the attorney-client privilege is deemed impliedly 
waived.”); Alexander v. Tandem Staffing Solutions, Inc., 881 So. 2d 607, 609 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a corporate counsel’s whistleblower 
claim qualified as a “controversy” under an analogous professional conduct 
rule, thus allowing the lawyer to divulge information that would otherwise be 
confidential); Mancheski v. Gabelli Group Capital Partners, 802 N.Y.S.2d 473, 
475 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (allowing a corporation’s former counsel to proceed 
in a shareholder action against the corporation despite duty to preserve confi-
dences); Nesenoff v. Dinerstein & Lesser, P.C., 786 N.Y.S.2d 185, 186 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2004) (“[A] lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of a 
client . . . . However, an attorney may reveal confidences and secrets to defend 
against an accusation of wrongful conduct.”); Spratley v. State Farm Mut. Au-
to Ins. Co., 78 P.3d 603, 609 (Utah 2003) (discussing the claim or defense ex-
ception to Rule 1.6 and allowing former in-house counsel to go forward with a 
suit for retaliatory discharge). 
 167. “Controversy” means “a discussion marked esp. by the expression of 
opposing views.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 272 (11th ed. 
2003). However, in legal terms “controversy” has a more narrow meaning, and 
refers only to matters that are or can be litigated. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
354 (8th ed. 2004). 
 168. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1071–72 (1991). 
 169. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.10(A) (making the right to 
respond to criticism dependent on the understanding that the response, what-
ever it may be, will not impair the fairness of an active case). 
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with reporters, or letters to newspapers. Judges filing lawsuits 
in the jurisdictions they control does more to harm the judi-
ciary than any speech—whether it “might reasonably be ex-
pected” to impair the fairness of an active case or not. For these 
reasons, even if the ABA’s Model Code passes constitutional 
muster by avoiding the underinclusiveness and overinclusive-
ness problems of Massachusetts’s code, there must be a better 
way. 
C. ANALYSIS OF OKLAHOMA’S RULE: THE USE OF “SHOULD” 
RATHER THAN “SHALL” 
One option is to replace “should” with “shall” and let judges 
decide for themselves what to say.170 The Oklahoma Code 
states that judges “should not . . . make any public comment” 
that may impair the fairness of an active case.171 The choice of 
the word “should” instead of “shall” carries significant weight 
in determining the meaning of Oklahoma’s rule. “Shall” gener-
ally means that the rule is mandatory;172 “should” generally de-
fines an aspirational goal.173 In contrast, Oklahoma retains a 
procedure for disciplining judges who fail to comply with the 
rules,174 and the Oklahoma Supreme Court reads the “should” 
language to be more than a mere guideline for interpretation by 
individual judges.175 But the code does not have to operate that 
way. The ABA, and individual states, could change the “shall” 
restrictions to “should” restrictions and leave in place the cur-
rent language that makes clear what each word means.176 
 
 170. Id. pmbl.; see OKLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(8). 
 171. OKLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(8). 
 172. See Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 493 (1935) (“The defendant ‘shall’ be 
dealt with in a stated way; it is the language of command, a test significant, 
though not controlling.” (citing Richbourg Motor Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 
528, 534 (1930))); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1407 (8th ed. 2004) (defining shall 
as “[h]as a duty to; more broadly, is required to . . . . This is the mandatory 
sense that drafters typically intend and that courts typically uphold”). 
 173. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT scope (“Where a Rule con-
tains a permissive term, such as ‘may’ or ‘should,’ the conduct being addressed 
is committed to the personal and professional discretion of the judge or candi-
date in question, and no disciplinary action should be taken for action or inac-
tion within the bounds of such discretion.” (emphasis added)). 
 174. Oklahoma provides for a “Council on Judicial Complaints” with the 
ability to discipline judges. OKLA. RULES GOVERNING COMPLAINTS ON JUDI-
CIAL MISCONDUCT R. 3. 
 175. See Pierce v. Pierce, 39 P.3d 791, 797 (Okla. 2001) (interpreting the 
“should” language in Canon 3 to be binding). 
 176. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT scope (explaining that 
“should” is a “permissive term”). 
 366 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:341 
 
“Shall” would define a mandatory rule; “should” would create 
discretionary guidelines. 
Such a system would solve the constitutional problems 
with the current rule, but it would create new problems of its 
own. Making the rules governing judicial speech discretionary 
would both overregulate and underregulate speech. The system 
would overregulate by perpetuating the tradition of judicial si-
lence that some commentators have labeled “judicial lock-
jaw.”177 That tradition of silence is exactly what a new rule in-
tended to restore public confidence in the judiciary should seek 
to avoid. A discretionary rule would also underregulate speech 
by removing the mechanism to punish violations, and conse-
quently allowing speech that could be harmful to the judiciary, 
litigants, criminal defendants, prosecutors, and the public. A 
better system remains available.178 
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR RESTORING PUBLIC CONFIDENCE 
IN THE JUDICIARY BY ENCOURAGING MORE JUDICIAL 
SPEECH  
This Note proposes a modification to the ABA’s Model Code 
of Judicial Conduct intended to add meaningful exceptions to 
judicial speech restrictions and promote an accessible, vocal ju-
diciary that remains respected by the public; a judiciary that 
“strives to maintain and enhance confidence in the legal sys-
tem.”179 This Note argues that judges should be encouraged to 
comment publicly, even about pending and impending cases, so 
long as those comments do not impair the fairness of the pro-
ceedings. Why begin a judicial speech rule with “judges shall 
not . . . .” when ideally judges should speak? Remove the “not.” 
Rather than discourage speech, encourage speech. Remove the 
code of silence surrounding the judiciary and let judges speak 
for themselves. 
 
 177. See generally Leslie B. Dubeck, Note, Understanding “Judicial Lock-
jaw”: The Debate over Extrajudicial Activity, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 569 (2007) (not-
ing that judges tend toward self-censorship even where constitutional and sta-
tutory law do not mandate it). 
 178. But see Stephen Reinhardt, Judicial Speech and the Open Judiciary, 
28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 805, 807 (1995) (“If we can trust judges enough to make 
decisions that affect every critical aspect of our lives, we can trust them to 
make these judgments as well. In my opinion, no Judicial Speech Code is ne-
cessary; if an individual judge abuses his discretion on occasion, so be it. The 
Republic will survive.”). 
 179. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. 
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A. REMOVE THE “NOT”: JUDGES SHOULD SPEAK 
Justice Black once declared that “[a]n unconditional right 
to say what one pleases about public affairs is what I consider 
to be the minimum guarantee of the First Amendment.”180 The 
statement was not then, nor is it now, the law, but it presents a 
broad view of speech rights emphasizing the First Amend-
ment’s underlying policy. Speech should be encouraged. Public 
affairs should be out in the open and broadly discussed. Public 
affairs include matters “pending or impending” before Ameri-
can courts. The judges presiding over those matters, individu-
als uniquely situated to speak knowledgably about them, 
should be encouraged to contribute to the public discourse.181 
When difficult decisions must be made in the courtroom, the 
judge’s voice should be just as loud as the editorial writer and 
tabloid reporter. 
To that end, the ABA should promulgate a new Model Rule 
2.10, and the states should adopt it. The new rule should read: 
RULE 2.10182 Judicial Statements 
  (A)A judge should make public statements that explain legal pro-
cedures and contribute to public understanding of the law and the 
American legal system. 
  (B)Paragraph (A) shall not apply, and a judge should refrain from 
making any public or nonpublic statement, if the judge reasonably be-
lieves that the statement would create a substantial likelihood of ma-
terial prejudice for any party to a matter pending or impending in any 
court.183 
  (C)A judge shall require that court staff, court officials, and others 
subject to the judge’s direction and control comply with Paragraphs 
(A) and (B) of this rule.184 
  (D)It shall not be a violation of Paragraph (B) if a judge responds 
to allegations in the media or elsewhere concerning the judge’s con-
duct in a matter pending or impending in any court. The judge should 
balance the value of a public response to the allegations, in terms of 
 
 180. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 297 (1964) (Black, J., con-
curring). 
 181. Reinhardt, supra note 178, at 806 (maintaining that judges should 
avoid giving thorough responses regarding unanswered constitutional issues, 
but, because of a judge’s “special knowledge and experience,” encouraging 
more judicial speech about controversial issues, such as the death penalty and 
the war on drugs, and their effect on the judicial system). 
 182. See supra Part II.A (discussing the current model rule). 
 183. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991) (establish-
ing the “substantial likelihood of material prejudice” standard to govern the 
regulation of attorney speech about active cases); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT R. 2.10(B). 
 184. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.10(C). 
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its ability to enhance public confidence in an impartial and indepen-
dent judiciary, against the harm to a fair disposition of a matter pend-
ing or impending before any court the judge reasonably believes 
would result from disclosure.185 
The proposed rule may seem like a radical change, but in 
reality it simply represents a shift in priorities. Rather than 
emphasizing judicial silence, it emphasizes judicial dialogue. 
The proposed rule still prohibits judicial speech about an active 
case if the judge “reasonably believes” that such speech would 
“impair the fairness” of that case. The proposed rule does not 
require anything different from judges. It makes a policy judg-
ment in favor of open communication by making clear that 
judges have a right, but not necessarily an obligation, to partic-
ipate in public discussions about the judiciary. It simply re-
moves the word “might,” and with it ample ambiguity. 
Perhaps the greatest change is the provision allowing a 
judge to respond to criticism in the media. The proposed rule 
would allow the judge to respond even if the judge believes a 
response would impair the fairness of an active case. The rule 
asks the judge to balance the potential harm to the judiciary 
and the public’s perception of the judiciary against the poten-
tial harm to impartial justice. It seems judges are well suited to 
such tasks. “If we can trust judges enough to make decisions 
that affect every critical aspect of our lives, we can trust them 
to make these judgments as well.”186 
Critics might argue that the proposed rule values speech 
over due process; public discourse over the right to a fair trial. 
Due process, especially for criminal defendants, is entrenched 
in our constitutional system and embodies the idea “that it is 
better a hundred guilty persons should escape, than that one 
innocent person should suffer . . . .”187 If a rule encouraging 
judicial speech prejudices a single criminal defendant, the critic 
might argue, it goes too far. But the critic’s argument ignores 
the availability of other remedies. A judge can sequester the 
jury to ensure prejudicial media coverage is avoided or, as a 
last resort, declare a mistrial and retry the case.188 
 
 185. See id. R. 2.10(E), pmbl. 
 186. Reinhardt, supra note 178, at 807. 
 187. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Benjamin Vaughan (Mar. 14, 1785), 
in WORKS OF THE LATE DOCTOR BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 246, 247 (1793). 
 188. See Robert S. Stephen, Prejudicial Publicity Surrounding a Criminal 
Trial: What a Trial Court Can Do to Ensure a Fair Trial in the Face of a “Me-
dia Circus,” 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1063, 1080–92 (1992) (describing potential 
remedies for prejudice that media coverage of a trial may cause). 
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Furthermore, judicial speech is more likely to promote 
fairness than impair it. Remember Judge Murphy? The news-
paper reports that started the public fiasco in Boston criticized 
Murphy for sentencing a rapist to probation rather than prison 
and for saying that the fourteen-year-old victim should “get 
over it.”189 The reporter attempted to ask Murphy about his de-
cision and the judge responded truthfully;190 he said he could 
not talk about the case, as the Massachusetts Code of Judicial 
Conduct requires.191 A simple response explaining the rational 
of his decision would have furthered public understanding of 
the law and respect for the judiciary. Providing context for his 
statement about the victim would have enabled the reporter to 
get the story right. It could have kept Murphy out of the tablo-
ids or even led to reform if some loophole in the law forced him 
to issue a lenient sentence. 
B. IMPLEMENTING THE NEW RULE GOVERNING JUDICIAL 
SPEECH 
The ABA adopted the current Model Code in February 
2007, and is unlikely to consider changes in the near future.192 
However, each state decides on its own how to regulate judicial 
conduct. Committees in ten states have issued proposed revi-
sions, but few states have formally adopted changes.193 Thirty-
three states have formed committees to review their codes and 
will make recommendations to the rule making authority in 
those states.194 Even though the ABA failed to recommend real 
changes in the judicial speech restrictions, ultimately the states 
have the power to make those changes, not the ABA. The states 
should consider real changes that would encourage judges to 
speak to the media and the public about their jobs. The rules 
committees in thirty-three states are in session now195 and 
could easily implement real changes in the near future. 
 
 189. Wedge & Crittenden, supra note 12. 
 190. Wedge, supra note 15. 
 191. MASS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(9). 
 192. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT intro. (2007). Before the 2007 
amendments, the code had most recently been amended in 1990. Id. 
 193. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 82. 
 194. Id. 
 195. See id. (naming many of the committees and providing links to the 
draft rules in some jurisdictions). 
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 CONCLUSION  
The time has arrived for judges to shed “the aura of tradi-
tion and mystery surrounding judicial decision making.”196 
Judges must protect the integrity of the judiciary, open a dialo-
gue with the press and the public, and stop filing questionable 
lawsuits to protect their personal interests.197 Most judges un-
derstand the influence and importance of their office and have 
traditionally exercised restraint associated with their presti-
gious positions.198 But with the rise of alternative news sources 
and increased competition for readers and advertising dollars, 
judges have become more frequent targets of critical reports 
and editorials.199 Rather than respond to criticism with law-
suits, judges should respond directly to the media and the pub-
lic. They should explain their judicial philosophies and the rea-
soning behind their decisions. 
Whether judges have a constitutional right to speak public-
ly about their ideas is an open question, but whether they 
should do so is not. The American public will no longer accept 
the traditional secrecy of the judiciary.200 It is time for judges 
at all levels to open their mouths, take out their pens, and 
speak to the public. Not just through formal opinions, but 
through opinion pieces in local newspapers, interviews on the 
radio and television, and roundtable discussions with other 
judges, scholars, and the public. The First Amendment “pre-
supposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered 
 
 196. Reinhardt, supra note 178, at 807; see also Hearing, supra note 2 
(statement of Judge Nancy Gertner, U.S. District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts) (arguing that diminished respect for the judiciary means 
judges must “prove” themselves); Geyh, supra note 1, at 875–76 (“[C]oncern for 
flagging public confidence in the courts dominates contemporary discourse on 
the administration of justice.”); Liptak, supra note 6 (noting the increase in 
lawsuits filed by judges); Mauro, supra note 6 (noting the risk that judges fil-
ing lawsuits in courts where they also provide creates the appearance of im-
propriety). 
 197. Mauro, supra note 6 (“Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia once said 
judges should adopt a ‘rope-a-dope’ posture when criticized, taking the hits 
passively until their adversaries wear themselves out. But with 25 judges 
suing for libel in 2005 alone—nearly 10 percent of all libel suits filed nation-
wide—that form of judicial restraint is fading . . . .”). 
 198. See generally Reinhardt, supra note 178, at 808. 
 199. See Nancy Gertner, To Speak or Not to Speak: Musings on Judicial 
Silence, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1147, 1148–49 (2004) (noting the changing media 
climate and the importance of judicial speech to maintaining the integrity of 
the judiciary). 
 200. Hearing, supra note 2 (statement of Judge Nancy Gertner, U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Massachusetts). 
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out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of author-
itative selection. To many this is, and always will be, folly; but 
we have staked upon it our all.”201 It is time for judges to join 
the conversation. 
 
 201. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 
1943) (Hand, J.), aff ’d, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). 
